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ABSTRACT. On November 23, 2015 the United Kingdom (UK) released a defense 
white paper detailing its national security strategic objectives. This work examines 
the geopolitical, economic, and strategic implications of this document and compares 
it with recent and historical defense white paper documents issued by the British 
government. It scrutinizes the text of these documents and relevant scholarly 
literature analyzing them while also examining the national security threats facing 
the UK at the time of their issuance and assesses whether the 2015 document will be 
supported with requisite political will, military personnel, and financial support to 
carry out its objectives. 
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Defense white papers, sometimes called national security strategy documents, 
are important expressions of countries national security policy goals. They 
describe the international security environment facing individual countries at 
given moments in time and how they expect to counter and defeat national 
enemies if resort to military force is required. The U.S. Government and 
military regularly issue national security policy documents such as the 
National Security Strategy of the United States issued by presidential admin- 
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istrations every four to five years, the congressionally mandated Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR) issued by the Department of Defense, and the 
National Military Strategy of the United States. Such documents are impor- 
tant assessments by governments of the day on their national and international 
security priorities and the financial measures they are willing to take to meet 
their national interests. These documents also cover economic, diplomatic, 
environmental, financial, and geopolitical factors influencing their ability or 
inability to achieve these objectives.1 
     This work examines recent the defense white paper released by the United 
Kingdom in November 2015. It will analyze the contents of historic defense 
white papers produced by the UK, the geopolitical factors influencing his- 
torical and contemporary British defense white papers, and the UK’s willing- 
ness and ability to carry out objectives described in these white papers given 
historical and current economic and security environments facing London. 
Such documents receive both praise and criticism from interested observers 
depending on their political perspectives. Research on these documents can 
reveal significant insights on how their governments addressed national 
security and economic priorities they confronted. These documents and 
research also demonstrate the degree of security coordination Britain has or 
does not have with its superpower ally the U.S.2 
     The UK has issued a number of defense white papers since World War II.  
Annual government parliamentary commissions called Statement on Defence 
and Statement on the Defense Estimates were issued from 1946–1996.3 The 
1957 Sandys Review issued by Minister of Defense Duncan Sandys (1908–
1987) during the Macmillan Government (1957–1963) was the first major 
post-war British defense white paper. Issued in the aftermath of the Suez 
debacle, this document stressed nuclear deterrence as the keystone of British 
defense policy recommending the abolition of compulsory military service, 
greater allied burden sharing with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
conventional forces, reducing overseas military forces and the number of 
Royal Air Force (RAF) fighters, and changing the Navy’s role to emphasize 
relying on aircraft carriers to project power in peacetime emergencies and 
limited hostilities.4 
    The next British defense white papers were issued between 1965–1968 by 
Harold Wilson’s Labour Government (1964–1970) under Minister of Defence 
Denis Healy (1917–2015). These documents and subsequently implemented 
policies involved withdrawing British military forces from east of the Suez, 
reducing the size of the territorial army, cancelling further construction of 
aircraft carriers and domestic aircraft construction, and reducing military 
forces deployed in Cyprus, Germany, and Malta due to financial crises 
forcing the pound’s devaluation.5 A decade later, another Wilson Labour 
Government under Minister of Defence Roy Mason (1924–2015) issued a 
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defense review (1974–1975) stating that defense spending would be reduced 
from 5% to 4% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) over ten years, that British 
defense spending should be harmonized with the NATO average which 
included 3.8% of GDP for France and 4.1% for Germany, and that London’s 
defense spending should be focused on the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact 
countries.6  
     The next major British defense review was initiated during Margaret 
Thatcher’s Conservative government (1979–1990) under the stewardship of 
Defence Minister John Nott. The Thatcher Government sought to increase 
defense spending and enhance British defense capabilities while recognizing 
the country’s significant financial constraints. Key features of the Nott Review 
(1981) included replacing the UK’s nuclear deterrent and rebuilding the 
reserve forces in order to meet the Soviet threat. The Royal Navy was 
injured by this review being targeted to lose nearly 20% of its destroyers and 
frigates, one aircraft carrier, and two amphibious ships. These plans were 
undermined by the Falkland Islands War in 1982 and some of the proposed 
naval force cuts were restored.7 
     The next British defense review Options for Change was issued in the 
Thatcher Administration’s waning months in July 1990 as the Cold War was 
winding down and widespread belief in a “peace dividend” allowing for 
reduced defense spending was prevalent. Addressing the House of Commons 
on July 25, 1990, Minister of Defence Tom King said the UK would retain 
four Trident nuclear submarines, seven air defense Tornado fighter squadrons, 
reduce defense spending as a share of GDP, maintain forces in Berlin as long 
as Soviet troops remained there, and plan for mid-1990s force level strengths 
of 120,000 for the Army, 60,000 for the Royal Navy/Marines, and 75,000 for 
the Royal Air Force representing an overall regular personnel reduction of 
18%.8 
     During 1994 John Major’s Conservative government (1990–1997) under- 
took a Defence Costs Study. Findings of this work included that MOD 
command structures should be streamlined, that many defense support 
responsibilities could be privatized though a Private Finance Initiative, and 
that since future military operations were likely to be carried out on a joint 
service basis that rationalizing command, training, and support infrastructures 
could potentially produce enhanced operational efficiency and increased 
financial savings. These recommendations were intended to reduce military 
and civilian personnel within the armed forces by 18,700 by 2000 with the 
most significant cuts coming from civilian workers and the RAF.9 
     Eighteen years of Conservative governments ended with the 1997 election 
of Tony Blair’s Labour government (1997–2007). The first Strategic Defense 
Review (SDR) issued by this government was produced in July 1998 under 
Minister of Defence George Robertson. This document stressed the emerging 
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threats to British security from developments in the Balkans and the Middle 
East, emphasizing the need to develop expeditionary forces capable of 
collaborating jointly to carry out operations in various potential operational 
theaters such as non-NATO regional conflicts, while acknowledging how 
rapid technological changes impacted military strategy, capability, and 
operational effectiveness. This document saw the Royal Navy’s destroyer/ 
frigate fleet reduced from 35 to 32 ships; the attack submarine fleet reduced 
from 12 to 10; the anti-mine fleet reduced from 25 ships to 22; and Royal 
Navy manpower reduced by 1,400. RAF fast jet aircraft were reduced from 
177 to 154 with the Germany-based 17th squadron being disbanded and the 
air defense force reduced from 100 to 87 aircraft. Territorial army size was 
projected to be reduced from 56,000–40,000.10 
     An updated version of the SDR was published in July 2002 and stressed 
changes in British defense strategy stemming from asymmetric warfare and 
Islamist terrorism as a result of the 911 terrorist attacks. Addressing the House 
of Commons on October 17, 2002, Defence Minister Geoff Hoon announced: 
 
Across Government, we have been set new challenges by inter- 
national terrorism. We have set in train work to re-examine our 
defence policy and plans in the light of the terrorist threat demon- 
strated on 11 September. We consulted widely and openly...As a 
result, we published a new chapter to the strategic defence review 
on 18 July. It shows that the strategic defence review’s emphasis 
on expeditionary operations working with allies was right, but 
demonstrates – crucially – how best to use our forces against a 
different sort of enemy: one that is determined, well hidden and 
vastly different from the conventional forces that we might have 
expected to face in the past.11 
 
Emphases of this New Chapter to the SDR included using defense diplomacy 
measures to create stability; maintaining wide and flexible ranges of military 
and non-military options to deter potential terrorism; and using military 
means to rapidly detect and destroy potential terrorist threats. Additional foci 
of the New Chapter included developing Network Enabled Capability to 
facilitate rapid intelligence gathering, decision making, and using required 
military force within real-time; and improving homeland defense by creating 
14 Civil Contingency Reaction Forces (CCRFs) from the Reserve Forces to 
give short-notice assistance to requests from emergency services or local 
authorities.12   
     This New Chapter was followed up in a December 2003 defense white 
paper presented to Parliament by Hoon. Key features of this document 
included stressing that: 
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 The UK not being able to militarily contribute in every international 
crisis and that its participation will generally be in coalitions. 
 That proactive engagement in conflict prevention, short-notice peace 
support, and counter-terrorist operations will be likely in the Middle East, 
North Africa, and the Persian Gulf. 
 That British Armed Forces must be more prepared for asymmetric attacks 
by state and non-state actors including the use of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction; and  
 UK forces need to be capable of executing demanding one-time large-
scale operations while also executing a simple small-scale peace support 
operation.13 
     This was followed up with a July 2004 defense white paper specifying 
force structure changes including increasing special forces numbers and 
equipment capabilities without providing quantitative details; retaining naval 
carrier strike and expeditionary force capabilities, decreasing the number of 
Nimrod surveillance aircraft from 21 to 16; restructuring the Army to facil- 
itate brigade level operations; reducing the number of Challenger 2 armored 
squadrons; building future combat aircraft around multirole Typhoon and 
Joint Combat aircraft capable of delivering offensive air and air defense 
capabilities; and spending approximately £3 billion ($4.467 billion) to upgrade 
helicopter combat platforms over the next ten years.14 
     These capabilities and charges of insufficient funding for them was made 
in a May 2004 RUSI Journal article which charged that the UK could no 
longer slice capabilities thinner; that some major procurement capabilities 
must be reexamined if current essential capabilities are to be sustained; and 
that the defense budget faces crisis due to flagship projects such as the Nimrod 
maritime reconnaissance aircraft, Eurofighter jet fighter, Astute submarine, 
and Brimstone anti-armor missile reaching cost overruns of £3 billion 
($4.467 billion).15 
    Continuing national British fiscal problems and the costs of funding 
military spending for emerging national and international security problems 
facing the United Kingdom would be felt particularly strongly in the 2010 
Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR). Issued by the newly elected 
Conservative-Liberal Democratic coalition government of Prime Minister 
David Cameron (CON-Witney) and Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg 
(LIB-Sheffield Hallam), the SDSR sought to integrate British national 
security policy beyond focusing on defense and military matters to include 
international aid and diplomacy, border and cyber security, and homeland 
defense looking ahead to the 2015 time frame.16 
     Upon entering office in May 2010, this government faced acute economic 
problems including a current budget deficit of £14.1 billion ($21 billion), a 
monthly net borrowing deficit of £16 billion ($23.827 billion), and net debt 
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of £903 billion ($1.344 trillion).17 The SDSR was published in October 2010 
with the influence of Secretary of State for Defence Liam Fox and it and an 
accompanying National Security Strategy emphasizing the need for additional 
economies and including the following five items as key priorities: 
 The pre-eminence of the UK’s defense and security relationship with the 
U.S. 
 Developing new models of practical bilateral defense and security 
cooperation with various allies and partners. 
 An effective and reformed United Nations. 
 NATO serving as the keystone of the UK’s defense. 
 An outward-looking European Union promoting security and prosperity.18 
 
                                  Source: UK Ministry of Defence 
 
This document noted that operations in Afghanistan were to remain a priority 
until 2015, that it is impossible to predict the nature of warfare in 2020 and 
beyond, and that it was vital for the UK to maintain capabilities enabling it 
to react to the demands of a changing environment. The UK’s strained 
finances made it necessary to make significant changes to service force 
structure with the most important being: 
 Decommissioning aircraft carriers and Harrier aircraft creating a 10 year 
gap in carrier strike capability. 
 Continue purchasing the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carrier and the 
carrier version of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. 
 Withdrawing all British forces from Germany by 2020. 
 Immediately canceling the Nimrod aircraft surveillance program. 
 Reducing the surface fleet from 23 destroyers and frigates to 19. 
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 Reducing the armed forces by 17,000 personnel with 7,000 coming from 
the Army, and 5,000 each from the Royal Navy and RAF. 
 Considering the implications of returning forces from Germany prior to 
decisions on closing the RAF Kinloss base and two other RAF bases iden- 
tified as superfluous.19 
     The 2010 SDSR was complimented and criticized from many quarters.  
One analysis praised it for stressing the importance of reserve forces in British 
military operations.20 However, it was described as being seriously flawed 
and dying over Libya during NATO military operations against the Qaddafi 
regime due to this operation being in conflict with SDSR recommendations 
favoring Britain place greater emphasis on conflict prevention;21 that it was 
likely to fail like previous defense white papers due to mismatches between 
strategic objectives and budget realities and failing to identify and anticipate 
national security challenges as they evolve;22 and that non-British observers 
must recognize that British policymakers still consider themselves an inter- 
nationally influential geopolitical and strategic player even with reduced 
financial capabilities when Whitehall formulates these documents.23 
Cameron’s Conservatives were reelected with a parliamentary majority 
victory in the May 2015 which reduced their former coalition partners to a 
rump minority.24 The five years since the 2010 SDSR have produced signif- 
icant changes in Britain’s security position due to the rise of the Islamic State 
in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Russian annexation of Crimea and military inter- 
vention into eastern Ukraine, increasing public concerns over stagnating 
European economic growth, skepticism over Britain’s membership in the 
European Union, and the ability and willingness of Muslim immigrants to 
assimilate into the UK and other European countries.25 
     All of these factors coalesced to enable Cameron’s government to release 
a new national security strategy on November 23, 2015.  
 
 
Courtesy: UK Ministry of Defence 
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This document, with the influence of Secretary of State for Defence Michael 
Fallon (CON-Sevenoaks), began by referring to the economic advances 
Cameron’s government contended it had accomplished by achieving greater 
economic growth and reducing the budget deficit. It also stressed that the 
Great Britain was the only major country in the world meeting the NATO 
target of spending 2% of its GDP on defense and the United Nations target 
of 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) on international development. The 
National Security Strategy and Strategic Defense and Security Review 
emphasizes that Britain could not choose between conventional defenses 
against state-based threats and the need to counter threats transcending 
national borders. It went on to mention that during the upcoming Parliament 
Britain must deter state-based threats, tackle terrorism, remain a global cyber 
security leader, and be able to respond rapidly to emerging crises.26 
     Specific force structure components advocated in the 2015 SDSR include: 
 Establishing two additional RAF Typhoon squadrons and an additional F-
35 Lightning carrier based squadron, buying nine new Maritime Patrol 
Aircraft based in Scotland to defend the nuclear deterrent, hunting down 
hostile submarines, and enhancing maritime search and rescue. 
 Expanding expeditionary forces from 30,000 in 2010 to 50,000 in 2025, 
doubling Special Forces spending, replacing four nuclear ballistic missile 
submarines to retain a Continuous at Sea Nuclear Deterrent, and increasing 
the Royal Navy’s frigate fleet. 
 Increase intelligence spending by £2.5 billion ($3.725 billion), employing 
over 1,900 additional staff, strengthening the network of counter-terrorism 
experts in the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa, 
increase counter-terrorism police investment, and more than doubling global 
aviation security spending. 
 Using the Diplomatic Service to promote national interests and influence, 
using the development budget to support fragile and broken states, promoting 
the rule of law, and responding rapidly to emerging crises overseas threaten- 
ing domestic security. 
 Working together with allies to deal with common threats such as ter- 




The SDSR was presented to the House of Commons on November 23, 2015, 
with Cameron concluding his remarks on this document stating: 
 
History teaches us that no Government can predict the future. We 
have no way of knowing precisely what course events will take 
over the next five years; we must expect the unexpected. But we 
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can make sure that we have the versatility and the means to 
respond to new risks and threats to our security as they arise. Our 
armed forces, police, and security and intelligence services are the 
pride of our country. They are the finest in the world, and this 
Government will ensure they stay that way. Using our renewed 
economic strength, we will help them to keep us safe for gener- 
ations to come. I commend this statement to the House.28 
 
Opposition Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn (LAB-Islington North) replied 
by saying his party supported increased government spending to deter ter- 
rorism. He went on to criticize what he saw as cuts to front line police spend- 
ing in this document, that the SDSR had “insufficient analysis” of inequality, 
poverty, diseases, human rights abuses, climate change, and water and food 
security. He went on to stress concern about Afghanistan’s ability to maintain 
its security, and said arms sales to regimes linked to funding terrorism 
should also be questioned.29 
Former Minister of Defence Liam Fox (CON-North Somerset) also noted 
that the 2010 Nimrod cancellation occurred due to Labour program mis- 
management and asked Cameron the impact of manning two aircraft carriers 
would have on naval personnel numbers. Cameron replied that Royal Navy 
personnel would increase by 400.30  
     Scottish National Party (SNP) MP Angus Robertson (SNP-Moray) expressed 
his party’s support for many SDSR provisions while expressing concern that 
insufficient air and naval assets were being provided by the military to 
monitor Russian incursions in the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap in the North 
Atlantic. Cameron responded by announcing that the number of aircraft in 
that region will be increasing and that in 2016 the government would publish 
a shipbuilding strategy paper and that many newly built ships will be 




Parliamentary committees began analyzing and conducting oversight of the 
2015 SDSR prior to its publication. On March 24, 2015 the House of Com- 
mons Defence Select Committee published the report Re-Thinking Defence 
to Meet New Threats, which addressed topics such as the state of British 
military forces since the 2010 SDSR, the emerging Russian threat, rebuilding 
conventional military capability to deter advanced nation threats in areas 
such as ballistic missile defense, weapons of mass destruction, maritime 
surveillance, and next generation warfare arenas including cyberwarfare, 
intelligence, and strategic communications.32 
     A Houses of Commons and Lords Joint Committee on the National 
Security Strategy existed in the 2005–2010 and 2010–2015 parliamentary 
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sessions33 and was reappointed for the 2015–2020 parliament by the House 
of Commons on November 30, 2015 and by the House of Lords on Decem- 
ber 3, 2015.34 This joint committee published a report on March 3, 2015 
detailing British security policy developments since the 2010 SDSR and 
presenting recommendations to the government including acknowledging the 
increasing likelihood of existential security threats within the next five years, 
advocating more strategic focus in the next SDSR, urging the government to 
make clearer statements on geopolitical priorities as part of the next security 
review, and the government clearly establishing resource priorities with risk 
assessments.35 
     The Commons Defence Select Committee published a report on November 
21, 2015 listing potential threat areas it believed the forthcoming SDSR 
should address including cyberwar and espionage, increasing instability in 
the Middle East and North Africa, non-state actors and hybrid warfare under- 
mining the international rules-based order, conflict potential in the South and 
East China Seas, the potential for Russian aggression in Europe and the 
Arctic, and possible reduction in support for NATO’s Article 5 commitment 
to defend other members if attacked. This report also expressed the com- 
mittee’s belief that Britain needs to address general security vulnerabilities 
including economic dependence on unreliable partners, an inability to react 
to sub-conventional threats, insufficient training opportunities for UK armed 
forces along with insufficient manpower and capabilities gaps within these 
forces, and insufficient areas of Whitehall expertise including language skills, 
local knowledge, deficient analytical capabilities about international crisis 
areas and insufficient consultation with UK subject experts in these fields 
and geographic regions.36 
   This committee also gathered evidence and conducted a hearing on the 
SDSR on November 24, 2015. Witnesses presenting evidence included Dr. 
David Blagden and Professor Patrick Porter of Exeter University’s Security 
and Strategy Institute;  Professor John Gearson and Dr. Chris Tuck of Kings 
College, London; and Peter Roberts, a Senior Research Fellow at the Royal 
United Services Institute. Roberts maintained that he saw this new SDSR as 
an indication that the government viewed Britain primarily as an economic 
power and that defense and security were subservient to economic ends.  
Tuck mentioned that this was a traditional looking defense paper with a 
status quo perception of Britain’s global role; that it overstates Britain’s soft 
power role; and that national aspirations are not matched by resources.37 
     Gearson noted that the new SDSR responded to significant private allied 
criticism of the 2010 SDSR by saying Britain is more outward looking and 
that it tries to link homeland security with the rise of ISIS. He went on to 
express his uncertainty that the document effectively linked these last two 
concepts. Porter’s opening statement emphasized Britain’s role with the U.S. 
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as a co-defender of the liberal world order as expressed in the document’s 
rhetorical emphasis on a “rules-based world order.” He also expressed that 
since World War II Britain has tried to exert international power beyond its 
capacity for such power projection. Blagden added that this document 
envisions a power that is not a superpower but greater than a minor power 





On December 2, 2015 an analysis by the British foreign policy think-tank 
Chatham House noted that the Cameron SDSR generally succeeded in 
providing a plausible outline for responding to state and non-state threats 
based on integrating domestic and foreign efforts of defense, intelligence, law 
enforcement, diplomatic and development agencies augmented by substantive 
defense spending increase. This assessment also said the SDSR politically 
strengthened the government’s domestic political position due to the chaotic 
state of the Labour Party opposition, and the skepticism of Conservative 
Party parliamentarians toward the European Union, their strong support for 
defense, and their displeasure at the cuts made during the 2010 SDSR.39 
    This Chatham House assessment also criticized the 2015 SDSR for making 
expensive commitments such as purchasing two aircraft carriers with requisite 
sized air groups and purchasing new maritime patrol aircraft. Additional 
criticism was made that review decisions were based more on lobbying efforts 
by various national security interest groups instead of objective analysis.  
Examples of such lobbying appear to be police lobbying against funding cuts 
following the November 13, 2015 Paris terror attacks and Army efforts to 
brand restructuring of its two strike brigades to enhance their attractiveness. 
Chatham House also said the review’s political character distorted national 
security policymaking by placing more emphasis on equipment instead of 
personnel; partially funding purchases by pay and personnel reductions; 
focusing on inputs such as money, equipment, or unit numbers instead of 
outputs such as measurable security improvements; and concentrating on 
means instead of ends such as funding military and intelligence capabilities 
but neglecting diplomats and civil servants to determine how and why new 




All defense white papers reflect the diplomatic, economic, political, and 
strategic environments in which they are produced. This is true for British 
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defense white papers as for comparable documents produced by other coun- 
tries. The 2015–2020 parliamentary cycle will see ongoing debate over the 
2015 British SDSR, the degree to which it is implemented, and how nations 
friendly and hostile to Britain will respond to its implementation. British 
armed force personnel size and military spending have fluctuated in recent 
years depending on economic circumstances and the perceived international 
security environment. The following tables quantify British defense spending 
in U.S. dollars, as share of GDP, and personnel size during the Cameron 
Government. 
 
   United Kingdom Defense Spending 2010–2014 U.S. Dollars 
2010 $62.928 billion 
2011 $60.270 billion 
2012 $57.702 billion 
2013 $55.264 billion 
2014 $54.914 billion41 
 







   United Kingdom Military Service Personnel Statistics – November 2015 
Air Force 37,020 -120 since November 1, 2014 
Army  121,430  +700 since November 1, 2014 
Navy 38,220 +120 since November 1, 2014 
Total  196,670 +710 since November 1, 201443 
 
   United Kingdom MOD Civilian Personnel Statistics 
October 1, 2014 64,530 
October 1, 2015 58,54044 
 
Many British defense white papers have sought to address London’s geo- 
political aspirations and national security interests within government spend- 
ing and political constraints. They also have sought to harmonize British 
national security goals with those of the United States and its North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. While Britain may no longer “rule the 
waves” as it did during the British Empire’s heyday and continues facing a 
conflict between significant financial constraints and sufficiently confronting 
external security threats, it remains one of the U.S.’ more important allies in 
the North Atlantic and European region and its well-trained and equipped 
forces have proven their mettle in multiple global theaters of operations.45 
     A key question is whether Britain sustains the will to enhance its defense 
capabilities? The 2015 SDSR, the presence of a Conservative majority gov- 
ernment unencumbered by an alliance with a more dovish Liberal Democratic 
Party, Labour Party disarray under Jeremy Corbyn, and recent Russian 
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military assertiveness offer cautious optimism that Britain may be able to 
sustain a more assertive international military stance. 
     Russian military incursions into British air and sea space over the past 
decade are particularly compelling reasons why London must augment its 
military capabilities. Between 2005 and early February 2015, the RAF 
launched Quick Reaction Alerts on 94 days to Russian military aircraft in- 
cursions into UK airspace and there were 23 air and 10 sea Russian military 
encroachments into UK air and sea space during this time period. The loca- 
tions of these encroachments involved the following geographic regions are: 
 
Location Air Sea Total 
North Sea 13 4 17 
Atlantic Ocean 6 1 7 
English Channel 0 5 5 
Unknown 4 0 4 
Total 23 10 3346 
 
Russian military aircraft involved in these incursions into the Tupolev Tu-95 
Bear Bomber, Tupolev-160 Blackjack Bomber, Tupolev-142 Bear F/J Bomber 
with the Tu-95 being involved in 16 of the 23 incidents. Russian naval 
vessels involved in these incursions include the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft 
carrier, Vice-Admiral Kulakov and Severamorsk Udaloy-class destroyers, the 
Yaroslav Mudry (Neutrashimy-class frigate, and an Akula class submarine 
with the Kuznetsov being involved in 4 of the 10 incidents.47 
     Many of Moscow’s aerial incursions into the UK began at Engels Air 
Force base and fly over Scandinavia then toward the UK and North Atlantic.  
Naval incursions tend to originate from the Baltic Fleet headquartered in 
Kaliningrad and pass through the North Sea on their way to the Atlantic.  
Northern Fleet units headquartered at Severomorsk near Murmansk tradi- 
tionally voyage from the Barents Sea and through the Norwegian Sea on 
their way to the North Sea, English Channel, and Atlantic Ocean.48  
     Descriptions of specific incidents of Russian military incursions into UK 
air and sea space include: 
 
December 12, 2011 
Incident Type: Sea 
Geographic Region: North Sea 
Description: HMS York sent to Scotland from Portsmouth after Admiral Kuznetsov 
and other Russian military vessels come within 30 miles of British shores. 
 
January 7, 2014 
Incident Type: Sea 
Geographic Region: North Sea 
Description: Royal Navy vessel sent from Portsmouth after the Admiral Kuznetsov 
and other Russian Northern Fleet ships anchor eight miles from Scotland’s coast in 
the Moray Firth. 
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September 19, 2014 
Incident Type: Air 
Geographic Region: Atlantic Ocean 
Description: RAF Typhoon Jets scrambled after one Tupolev Tu-95 Bear bomber 
approaches UK airspace. 
 
January 28, 2015 
Incident Type: Air 
Geographic Region: Atlantic Ocean 
Description: RAF Typhoon Jets scrambled after two Tupolev Tu-95 Bear bombers 
come within 25 miles of UK shoreline. These craft may have been flying with their 
transponders turned off making them invisible to civilian aircraft. 
 
February 17, 2015 
Incident Type: Sea 
Geographic Region: English Channel 
Description: HMS Argyll shadows frigate Yaroslav Mudryy in the English Channel. 
 
May 14, 2015 
Incident Type: Air 
Geographic Region: North Sea 
Description: Two Typhoon fighters scrambled to intercept two Bear bombers 
approaching UK airspace.49 
 
 Russian Aircraft and Naval Incursions into British Air and Seaspace 
  
 Source: Daily Mail 
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Like other western countries, the United Kingdom has been devoting a 
declining share of its governmental budget resources to defense spending 
and military personnel numbers have fluctuated over the past decade.50 This 
occurs at a time when it and its NATO allies face increasing aggression from 
transnational terrorist groups such as ISIS and resurgent Russian military 
power as demonstrated by Moscow’s increasing aggressiveness in British 
airspace and maritime approaches. Russian military assertiveness was also 
visibly demonstrated in its National Security Strategy signed by Vladimir 
Putin on December 31, 2015. This document explicitly criticizes Western 
efforts to enhance Eurasian region tensions to undermine Russian interests 
while also condemning the U.S. and European Union countries for support- 
ing an “unconstitutional” coup in Ukraine producing deep Ukranian societal 
schisms and the outbreak of armed conflict. This document also claims that 
the U.S. and its allies seek to maintain their international affairs dominance 
by undermining Russian foreign and domestic policy.51 
     Despite the presence of punitive western economic sanctions against 
Russia for its 2014 seizure of Crimea from Ukraine, Russia continues  
enhancing its defense capabilities. Russian defense expenditures from 2010–
2014 and the percentage of its GDP spent on defense is as follows: 
 
 57 
2010 $65.809 billion 3.8% 
2011 $70.237 billion 3.7% 
2012 $80.996 billion 4.0% 
2013 $84.841 billion 4.2% 
2014 $91.694 billion 4.5%52 
 
Russia also continues modernizing its armed forces in a process initiated in 
2008 by Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and continuing under Sergei 
Shoigu. This modernization affects all branches of Russia’s armed forces 
including testing of the PAK FA fifth generation combat aircraft in 2016, 
introduction of the T-90 main battle tank, increasing the number of nuclear 
submarines with Bulava missiles, and developing the Sarmat liquid fuel silo-
based ICBM. Russia also aspires to have 80% its military consist of post-
Soviet equipment by 2025, expanding the military’s hybrid warfare capa- 
bilities, and the continuing critical importance of nuclear weapons and 
asymmetric warfare such as cyber warfare in Russian military doctrine make 
it imperative that Britain and other western countries equip their militaries to 
deter and defeat potential Russian military coercion despite the financial 
strains Moscow is experiencing due to declining energy prices and western 
economic sanctions.53 
     The financial efficiency of British military spending must also be con- 
sidered as a critical factor in determining the UK’s ability to meet the 2015 
SDSR’s force enhancement aspirations. A December 2015 National Audit 
Office (NAO) assessment mentioned that the Defence Equipment & Support 
(DE&S) section of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) responsible for managing 
MOD’s equipment acquisition and life-cycle support noted deficiencies in 
DE&S’ cost controls. These included identifying and recording private 
sector support costs and other program costs pertinent to defining operating 
cost envelope accuracy and DE&S’ inability to provide NAO with sufficient 
evidence to support private sector support costs and related trade and pay- 
ables balances to accurate record transactions supporting defense spending in 
order to receive an unqualified audit opinion in 2015–2016 financial state- 
ments.54 
     It remains to be seen if the more assertive rhetoric in the 2015 SDSR will 
be matched by budgetary and personnel enhancements in the British military 
force structure. Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne (CON-Tatton) 
announced on June 4, 2015 that Britain had the fastest growth rate of G7 
economies in 2014. During 2015 Britain experienced economic growth of 
2.2% representing twelve consecutive quarters of growth and governmental 
borrowing declined from over £12 billion ($17.315 billion) in 2009/2010 to 
£7.5 billion ($11.302 billion) as of December 2015. Such developments may 
provide cautious optimism that the UK can sustain increased defense spend- 
ing.55 At the same time, this document suffers from a talismanic fetish 
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believing that international development expenditures represent a valid 
quantitative measure for documenting national security. It also is weakened 
by saying that spending 2% of British Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on 
defense spending or any other percentile of GDP on defense spending are 
valid indicators of the quality and quantity of British national military 
policymaking and combat performance capabilities. 
     There is a need for the UK to emphasize lethal force strike and sustain- 
ment capability to counter and defeat potential Russian aggression in the 
Arctic and Europe along with countering and defeating Islamist operations in 
the Mideast and North Africa. An early 2016 scholarly assessment of the 2015 
SDSR observed that the December 2015 parliamentary vote authorizing air 
strikes in Syria was a sign that the UK was moving from strategic shrinking 
to greater international engagement while also maintaining it was to early to 
determine if spending 2% of GDP on defense would be sufficient to meet 
national security aspirations.56 Civilian and military British national security 
policy analysts and policymakers must engage in ongoing reviews and 
updates of domestic and international economics, public opinion, military 
capabilities, and strategic trends and developments to determine if the 2015 
SDSR satisfactorily addresses Britain’s emerging national security requirements.  
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